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Subliminal stimuli, of which subjects are unaware, affect movements made to subsequent visible
cues. Sumner and colleagues in this issue of Neuron show that restricted supplementary motor
and eye field lesions compromise voluntary control of action because they disrupt the normal uncon-
scious and automatic inhibition of alternative movements partially activated by subliminal stimuli.Of the many premotor areas, it is those
on the brain’s medial surface that have
been most closely associated with
volition. The supplementary motor
area (SMA) was the first premotor
area to be identified on the medial sur-
face, but it is now clear that the region
is composed of a myriad of areas in-
cluding the pre-supplementary motor
area (pre-SMA), the supplementary
eye field (SEF), and various cingulate
motor areas.
In order to investigate volition and
the voluntary selection of action,
many investigators have contrasted
two situations. In the first, animals or
people are presented with cues, each
of which has an association with a
particular action. The subject selects
the appropriate action when given each
cue (Bunge et al., 2005; Passingham,
1993; Wise and Murray, 2000). In the
other situation, the same actions are
made but in the absence of any instruc-
tion. The contrast is intended to cap-
ture the difference between, for ex-
ample, the case where a car driver is
instructed to start moving by a green
traffic light and other situations in which
drivers just start of their own ‘‘free will.’’
Selective lesions of either the SMA/
pre-SMA or some cingulate regions,
but not of lateral premotor regions,
stop macaques from freely deciding
when to raise their arms in the absence
of any instructing cue. The same ani-
mals can still use arbitrary rules to
guide selection between one similar
action and another (Thaler et al., 1995).
At first, such results led many to
agree the SMA had a central role inguiding voluntary choice, but subse-
quently its contribution has appeared
less clear. Neuroimaging studies that
have attempted to capture activation
changes associated with the initiation
of a voluntary response have empha-
sized the pre-SMA rather than the
SMA itself (Lau et al., 2004). It might
be argued that in some studies the ex-
perimenter defines the sole action that
the subject can make and the only de-
cision left to the subject is when to act.
Nevertheless, studies that have looked
at other aspects of high level volun-
tary behavior in situations in which
unambiguous cues for action are un-
available, for example when changing
between one task and another
(Rushworth et al., 2002) or from one
action sequence to another (Kennerley
et al., 2004), have still reported the
pre-SMA is the critical area. Pre-SMA
neurons are active when a macaque
changes from the most automatic
way of performing a task to a new re-
sponse (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007).
Related activity patterns have been
reported when macaques switch be-
tween sequences, but such neurons
have not been reported in the SMA
(Tanji, 2001). In summary, investiga-
tors have refined the paradigms that
they use to examine voluntary action
selection, but in so doing they have of-
ten focused on the behaviors that we
most intuitively feel must be voluntary;
these often involve situations in which
action selection is difficult and nonau-
tomatic. While they have confirmed
the importance of the pre-SMA in vol-
untary action selection, the uncertaintyNeuron 5about whether the SMA has a role, and
what that role might be, has increased.
In this issue of Neuron, Sumner and
colleagues (2007) address the problem
of voluntary behavior from a new angle.
They point out that other premotor
mechanisms select actions in re-
sponse to cues and instructions. They
argue that a prerequisite for voluntary
selection of actiongoals is the suppres-
sion of actions that are automatically
and inadvertently primed and triggered
by cues in the environment. Such an
inhibitory process would ensure that
partially activated responses do not
prevent the selection of alternative ac-
tions. An intriguing paradigm devel-
oped by Eimer and Schlaghecken
(2003) looks at just such automatic
inhibitory processes. Subjects are pre-
sented with target arrows instructing
left or right responses. The target
arrows are preceded by subliminal
primes, the same or the opposite arrow
followed immediately by a mask and
thereby rendered invisible. Despite
their inability to report prime identity
subjects’ responses to the subsequent
target arrows are affected. Reaction
times (RTs) are faster when the prime
and target instruct the same response
but only if the interval is short. Primes
that are identical to targets slow RTs
as the intervening time between prime
and target increases beyond 100 ms.
It is this pattern of RT change that
Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003) took
as evidence that partially activated re-
sponse representations were inhibited
to ensure ‘‘a level playing field on which
alternative actions can occur.’’4, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 669
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bition of partially activated responses
no longer occurs when human patients
sustain SMA lesions. Sumner and col-
leagues (2007) argue that it would have
been difficult to assess whether the
SMA had a critical role in mediating
such automatic inhibitory processes
by recording activity in the region; ac-
tivation might be recorded in relation
to action cues, but it would not be clear
if the activity corresponded to selec-
tion or inhibition of the response.
Sumner and colleagues (2007), how-
ever, tested two unusual patients
who had sustained extremely small
medial frontal ‘‘microlesions.’’ The in-
vestigators used a range of structural
and functional neuroimaging tech-
niques to be certain of their locations.
In one patient, CB, the lesion included
both SMA and SEF. SMA and SEF
neurons are active during hand and
eye movements, respectively (Fujii
et al., 2002). In the second patient,
JR, the lesion was restricted to the
SEF. Inhibition of partially activated re-
sponses involving either hand or eye
movements was lost in CB. Only the
inhibition of partially activated eye
movements was compromised in JR.
The automatic inhibition processes
are effector specific, and they are me-
diated by specific anatomical regions.
In the patients, RTs were speeded
rather than slowed when primes
matched targets even when separated
by relatively long intervals.
Sumner and colleagues (2007) also
examined patients with much larger le-670 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevsions in either the pre-SMA or in lateral
premotor regions, but they always
found normal automatic inhibition
processes. The role Sumner and col-
leagues identify for the SMA/SEF
seems unique within the motor system.
The SMA/SEF region is involved in
inhibiting partially activated move-
ments, and crucially the inhibition pro-
cess is automatic and subconscious.
Even when subjects were unaware of
having seen a prime and lacked any
reported sense of difficulty, they were
still slower to respond to a target cue
instructing the same movement more
than 100 ms later. The inhibitory pro-
cess, itself automatic and nonvolun-
tary, may be a prerequisite for volun-
tary behavior. The SMA’s inhibitory
role is quite distinct to that of the pre-
SMA and other adjacent rostral medial
frontal regions which have consistently
been identified with response selec-
tion processes that are experienced
as both difficult and voluntary (Botvi-
nick et al., 2004; Dux et al., 2006; Ken-
nerley et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2004;
Rushworth et al., 2002). Other mecha-
nisms of behavioral inhibition have
also been suggested in frontal regions
beyond the premotor system, but their
relationship with the SMA remains un-
clear (Aron et al., 2007). Whether every
contribution the SMA makes to behav-
ior can be accounted for in the same
terms is uncertain. What will intrigue
cognitive neuroscientists, however, is
the possibility that an involuntary pro-
cess mediated by the SMA might be
so important for voluntary behavior.ier Inc.REFERENCES
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